Le 20 février 2006, le CRTC a publié un avis public pour annoncer son intention de déléguer ses pouvoirs relatifs à l’établissement et à l’administration de l
a liste d’exclusion nationale, aux enquêtes concernant les infractions à celle-ci et au financement de celle-ci en vertu de l’article 41 du proje
t de loi(35). Cette délégation de pouvoirs s’inscrit dans la politique générale du CRTC de s’abstenir d’intervenir directement dans ce qu’il estime être de la « réglementation économique
» et de privilégier ...[+++]plutôt une autoréglementation de l’industrie(36).On 20 February 2006 the CRTC issued a public notice stating its intention to delegate its authority in establishing, administering, investigating offences of, an
d financing for the national do-not-call list pursuant to section 41 of the Act (35) This decision to delegate its authority corresponds with the CRTC’s general policy to refrain from directly involving itself in what it considers “economic regulation,” thus showing a preference for industry self-regulation (36) The administration of the eventual do-not-call list will be delegated to a non-governmental operator (the “Operator”) that is to be responsible for creating, implementing
...[+++] and managing the do-not-call list database (37) Originally, the selection of an operator was to be carried out by a consortium of interested parties (the “Consortium”) created for the sole purpose of conducting the selection process (38) However, long delays in the establishment of the Consortium resulted in the CRTC deciding that it would seek the Operator itself (39) Thus, qualified respondents will be asked to submit final proposals that include financial, technical, operational and administrative details (40) Currently, the CRTC is in the process of choosing the Operator.