In Kozarov, for example, Justice Harrington rejected the constitutional argument, noting that Mr. Kozarov had the absolute mobility r
ight, as a Canadian citizen, to return to Canada once his sentence was served, and that, if the Minister had consented to the tr
ansfer, Mr. Kozarov could not on his arrival h
ave immediately asserted his mobility right to leave Canada.49 Mobility rights were not the issue, he said; rather “the transfe
...[+++]r of supervision of a prison sentence” was.50 Justice Harrington distinguished the Van Vlymen case on the basis that the “driving force of that decision was the failure to decide within a reasonable time frame,” not the constitutionality of the legislative provisions themselves.51
Dans l’affaire Kozarov, par exemple,le juge Harrington a rejeté l’argument constitutionnel, indiquant que M. Kozarov avait, en qualité de citoyen canadien, le droit absolu de rentrer au pays après avoir purgé sa peine et que, si le Ministre avait consenti au transfèrement, M. Kozarov n’aurait pas pu à son arrivée au Canada se prévaloir immédiatement de sa liberté de quitter le pays49.