And we can see where the problem lies because we can imagine a situation where a judge, having heard a criminal case, may very well decide to acquit the accused on the basis of reasonable doubt, but in the case of a request by the attorney general for the issuance of a peace bond, the same judge having heard the same evidence may say: ``I did acquit you on the basis of reasonable doubt, but on the basis of the preponderance of evidence, I come to the conclusion that you have committed the offence and that measures must be taken to protect society against you''.
Et on voit le problème, parce qu'on peut, à la limite, se placer dans la situation suivante: un juge ayant entendu une preuve en matière criminelle, et jugeant sur la base du doute raisonnable, pourrait très bien en venir à la conclusion qu'il doit acquitter une personne, étant donné que le doute raisonnable joue en sa faveur.